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Abstract
The recent literature offers several models of the no-
tion of matter-of-fact supposition1 revealed in the ac-
ceptance of the so-called indicative conditionals. Some
of those models are qualitative (Collins 1990), (Levi
1996), (Stalnaker 1984). Other probabilistic mod-
els appeal either to infinitesimal probability or two
place probability functions ((van Fraassen 1995), (Joyce
1999), (McGee 1994)). Recent work has made possible
to understand which is the exact qualitative counter-
part of the latter probabilistic models ((van Fraassen
1995), (McGee 1994), (Arlo´-Costa & Thomason 1996),
(Arlo´-Costa & Parikh 1999), (Arlo´-Costa 1997). In this
article we show that the qualitative notion of change
that thus arises is hypothetical revision, a notion pre-
viously axiomatized in (Arlo´-Costa 1997) and (Arlo´-
Costa & Thomason 1996).
This notion is incompatible with AGM as well as with
other standard methods of theory change (like Mendel-
zon and Katsuno’s UPDATE). The way in which
matter-of-fact supposition is modeled via hypothetical
revision is illustrated via examples. The model is com-
pared with other qualitative models of indicative sup-
position (like the one offered in (Levi 1996) and (Stal-
naker 1984)), with models of subjunctive supposition,
as well as with some of the well know models of learn-
ing. Applications in the theory of games and decisions
are considered.
Introduction
The notion of supposition has a central role in prob-
ability theory and the theory of games and decisions.
The notion is usually formalized by appealing to con-
ditional probability. At each point in time the internal
epistemic state of a Bayesian agent is formalized by
an unconditional measure encoding its degree of belief
and by conditional measures encoding the coherent de-
gree of belief of the agent conditional on suppositions.
The notion of supposition is usually carefully separated
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1I am using here the terminology used by James Joyce
in (Joyce 1999), pages 182-83.
form the notion of learning. Brian Skyrms has stated
this distinction as follows in (Skyrms 1987):
Updating subjective belief to assimilate a given
piece of information and supposing what the world
would be like were that bit of information true, are
distinct mental processes for which different rules
are appropriate...
Minimizing divergence with respect to a given con-
straint is the hallmark of supposition, not of learning
(Joyce 1999), (Diaconis & Zabell 1982). Imposing a
constraint is tantamount to fix important features of the
final state to which the current state P will be mapped
and then minimizing some function measuring diver-
gence from P and any of the possible states exhibiting
the selected feature.
We will not focus here in the probabilistic side of
the literature distinguishing learning and supposition.
Reviewing this literature is well beyond the space limi-
tations of this abstract. Nevertheless the curious reader
can consult (Joyce 1999), (Levi 1996), (Levi 1980),
(Skyrms 1987). Let me just mention in passing that
the distinction between learning and supposing can be
obviously made in a purely qualitative setting. For ex-
ample, some authors doubt the universality of the so-
called axiom of success establishing that when we revise
the current state K with any input A, this input should
be part of the revised output K*A. After all, when an
agent is faced with certain evidence, he might decide to
reject it. While this might be true for learning, this is
hardly true for supposing. A moment of reflection will
convince the reader that the success axiom is constitu-
tive of any reasonable notion of supposition. Something
similar happens with the general justification of the op-
eration of contraction. Why any agent might be per-
suaded to loose information that at the moment he fully
believes? This has led some researchers to propose that
contraction cannot be one of the fundamental opera-
tions of theory change. Again, this is not a problem for
the notion of supposition. An agent can perfectly well
engage in a hypothetical exercise that requires contract-
ing his view, while he continues to fully believe what he
fully believes. Considerations of this type can be ad-
duced in order to propose a priori reasonable axioms
for supposing. This will not be, nevertheless, our only
way of proceeding here. We will appeal to work previ-
ously done in probability theory (in order to formalize
supposition) and then we will determine which are the
constraints on qualitative supposition induced by the
probabilistic model. This will require, of course, en-
gaging in the non-trivial task of bridging the notions of
probability and belief. Before plunging into this prob-
lem, let me delineate intuitively first which is the type
of supposition that we want to capture in this essay.
It is usually recognized that there are at least two
main forms of supposition. James Joyce puts the con-
trast between these two salient varieties of supposing in
a nice way:
Was Hamlet written if Shakespeare did not write
it? Would Hamlet have been written if Shake-
speare had not written it? Unless you are one
of those who think that Christopher Marlowe or
the earl of Oxford wrote the plays commonly at-
tributed to Shakespeare, you will answer ‘yes’ to
the first question and ‘no’ to the second. Here
you are supposing in two distinct ways that Shake-
speare did not write Hamlet. When you suppose it
matter-of-factly you ask how things are if, as a mat-
ter of fact, Shakespeare did not write the play, and,
since you know that the play was written by some-
one, you conclude that it must have been someone
other than Shakespeare. On the other hand, when
you suppose that Shakespeare did not write Ham-
let in the subjunctive mode you ask how things
would have been in a counterfactual situation in
which Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, and, as
Shakespeare was a singular genius, you conclude
that the play would not have been written at all.
These two species of supposition [...] are repre-
sented probabilistically by Bayesian conditioning
and by imaging [(Joyce 1999), page 182-83].2
The examples used by Joyce were first formulated
by Jonathan Bennett and even previously by Ernest
Adams in a much quoted essay (Adams 1970). Adams’
example is structurally identical. Suppose that you are
a convinced Warrenite. Then you will probably accept
that ‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did’.
Nevertheless this is compatible with your eventual re-
jection of ‘ If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone
else would have’.
In this essay we will only deal with the act of sup-
posing revealed by our practices of accepting or re-
jecting indicative sentences, like ‘ If Oswald didn’t kill
Kennedy, someone else did’.
2The qualitative counterpart of imaging is Mendelzon
and Katsuno’s UPDATE, a notion well know in the KR
community. Imaging was first proposed in (Lewis 1976)
as the method of supposition, revealed in the acceptance
of counterfactuals. Again here the idea is to characterize a
suppositional method, rather than an algorithm for learning,
following Skyrms’ ideas - Lewis, personal communication.
Two immediate comments are required here. First we
need a qualification of Joyces’s point about matter-of-
fact supposition. Joyce’s proposal of capturing matter
of fact supposition via standard Bayesian conditioning
needs a clarification. Consider the case where aWarren-
ite accepts ‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else
did’. This can hardly be captured by saying that the
conditional probability of S (someone else aside from
Oswald killed Kennedy) given not-O is 1. In fact, a
Warrenite might be convinced that Oswald alone killed
Kennedy. Therefore the proposition not-O has, from
his point of view zero measure, or infinitesimal mea-
sure.3 In any of those cases it seems that we need an
extension of conditional probability in order to capture
the notion of supposing involved in the acceptance of
the conditional in question. Joyce allows for this exten-
sion, as well as other authors ((van Fraassen 1995), for
example). We will appeal to the same idea here.
The second comment is related to a purely qualita-
tive account of these examples. Some authors propose
to formalize matter-of-fact supposition via AGM and
subjunctive supposition via UPDATE. Before consider-
ing a probabilistic analysis of matter of fact supposition
we will argue that an unmodified version of the previous
proposal is unfeasible.
Matter-of-fact supposition and AGM
There are several reasons explaining why AGM is in-
adequate to capture matter-of-fact supposition. In the
case of the probabilistic brand of matter-of-fact suppo-
sition that we are about to characterize, the conflict
between the two notions amounts to logical incompat-
ibility. Here we will focus on some of the most salient
reasons explaining both conflicts. Others reasons will
be provided below.
Let’s consider the simple case related to modeling
the matter-of-fact supposition involved in accepting ‘If
Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did’. The
following figure represents a plausible way in which a
Warrenite might calibrate his plausibility order, where
O is ‘Oswald alone did shot Kennedy’ and S is ‘Someone
3To be sure there is not need for the Warrenite to assign
measure one to ‘Oswald alone killed Kennedy’: O. But as
long as the agent is certain or ‘almost certain’ of O he should
do so - see (Gardenfors 1988). There are two alternatives
to this view. A radical one assumes that only logical truths
are candidates for full belief. A less radical one (defended
in chapter 6 of (Maher 1993)) denies that probability one
should entail or be entailed by full belief. Neither option
is palatable and both have been rejected by the foremost
theorists working in the area of belief change. According
to the first option the only interesting and viable notion
that epistemologists should study is probability kinematics.
Belief change understood as the change of bodies of full
belief containing more than mere tautologies is not a viable
enterprise. The second alternative severs completely the
connection between action and belief. Even when an agent
declares that he fully believes a proposition, this assertion
does not commit him to assign any degree of belief to the
proposition - zero degree is also permissible.
else did it’. The letter J stands for ‘Lyndon Johnson
became president’.
κ Possible worlds
0 O, not-S, J
1 not-O, S, J
2 S, O, J
3 not-S, not-O, not J
Fig. I.
A convinced Warrenite can plausibly organize states
incompatible with his view as is depicted in Fig. 1. The
immediate rank after the less implausible state (rank
0) is the one in which some person other than Oswald
killed Kennedy. Of course there are other possible rank-
ings compatible with the maximal lack of implausibility
of (O, not-S, J) and the acceptance of ‘If Oswald didn’t
kill Kennedy, someone else did’. But in any case (not-O,
S) should receive a rank strictly below the one assigned
to (not-S, not-O).4
So, at first blush it seems that one can rationalize
matter of fact supposition via standard AGM methods.
What about the corresponding subjunctive? ‘If Oswald
had not killed Kennedy, someone else would not have
done it’ can, of course, be accepted, but acceptance is
performed in this second case with respect to a different
ordering. In this case we need a ranking where (not-S,
not-O) is assigned a rank strictly lower than the rank
assigned to (not-O, S) - and where the 0-rank coincides
with the one in Fig. I.5
Perhaps the acceptance of the subjunctive can be
rationalized by appealing to an ordering of the type
just described. The previous analysis also shows the
interesting fact (sometimes neglected) that matter-of-
fact supposition can perfectly well be counter-doxastic.
In other words, although matter-of-fact supposition is
a form of supposition that intends to preserve the given
facts, in some occasions such type of change requires
the formulation of belief-contravening hypothesis. The
problem with matter-of-fact supposition is that only
some counter-doxastic propositions are entertainable,
while the supposition of other counter-doxastic propo-
sitions leads to incoherence.6 This is one of the facts
that will show that AGM does not provide the right
4Since the atoms S and O are enough to identify the
worlds used in the example, we will not use J to name them
5Two clarifications. First we follow the standard proce-
dure according to which the rank of a proposition is defined
as the lowest rank where the proposition holds. Secondly,
AGM and UPDATE both apply to a general case where
the lowest rank encoding beliefs can contain a set of worlds,
rather than just a singleton. But they can yield different
verdicts even when applied to singletons. This is related to
the fact that the intended ontological or causal interpreta-
tion of UPDATE requires a notion of similarity that may
very well differ from the epistemically motivated metrics re-
quired by AGM.
6The nature of the beliefs under revision is an issue
that will require careful analysis. Here we will propose to
view those changes as expectation-contravening, rather full-
belief-contravening.
framework for capturing matter of fact supposition.
Let’s consider the former example again. It is per-
fectly plausible to suppose subjunctively that nobody
killed Kennedy. Moreover in that setting it seems right
to accept ‘If nobody had killed Kennedy, then Lyn-
don Johnson wouldn’t become president’. But notice
that ‘If nobody did kill Kennedy, then Lyndon Johnson
didn’t become president’ seems absurd (the example is
a variant of one recently used by Adams in (Adams
1998), page 281). Nevertheless if we use the ranking
in Fig I. this conditional should be accepted. Upon re-
flection one sees that the failure is radical. In fact, it
seems that one cannot coherently use the matter of fact
mood in order to suppose that nobody did kill Kennedy.
This is commonly seen by the fact that people are prone
to accept conditionals of the form: ‘If nobody did kill
Kennedy, then I ’, where a highly implausible proposi-
tion I is used as consequent.7
To put it in a more technical manner, matter of fact
supposition is not consistency preserving. The ranking
of an agent who engages in matter of fact supposing
includes up to rank 2 in Fig. I. The world in rank 3 is
non-entertainable. Of course ‘Nobody killed Kennedy’
is a consistent proposition. Nevertheless, when sup-
posed matter-of-factly leads the agent to an incoherent
hypothetical state.
The notion of matter-of-fact supposition is rather elu-
sive. Joyce, for example, tries to characterize it by
saying that ‘the hallmark of matter-of-fact supposition
is that it never forces the supposer to revise any of
her views about the ‘facts’, that is to say propositions
that she is certain are true’. This prima facie char-
acterization is certainly accurate when one evaluates
events of non-zero measure. But we saw in the previ-
ous example that an agent can indeed entertain sup-
positions (matter-of-factly) carrying zero measure and
revise with them the lowest rank of their plausibility
measure. In the example all the measure can be lo-
cated in rank 0. Then not-O is a permissible candidate
for matter-of-fact supposing, although it carries mea-
sure zero. Matter of fact supposition may require to
consider how the world is like when a proposition car-
rying zero measure is assumed true for the sake of the
argument.
The intuition in the example we considered is that
there is a set of ‘hard facts’ about the world that can
never be discarded when the view of the Warrenite is
hypothetically changed in a matter-of-fact mood. The
central ‘hard’ fact in the example is the presupposi-
tion that somebody killed Kennedy – and Johnson be-
come president. As Joyce suggests when one supposes
matter-of-factly none of those hard facts are candidates
for revision. The entertainable propositions are the
ones entailed by the worlds in ranks 0, 1 and 2. But
one can certainly suppose items compatible with those
hard facts. In doing so one needs to revise the view
7An example is: ‘If nobody did kill Kennedy, then I am
the Pope’.
encoded in rank 0. For example, anyone holding the
ranking in Fig. I should accept ‘If someone else other
than Oswald shot Kennedy then Oswald did not do it’.
This account presupposes that certainties (full beliefs)
are not encoded by the 0-rank. If this is so which is
the attitude encoded in the 0-rank? We will see that
a probabilistic modeling of matter-of-fact supposition
will naturally lead to the idea that the 0-rank encodes
an epistemological notion weaker than certainty, which
we will call expectation. The underlying idea is that al-
though expectations and certainties (full beliefs) carry
measure one (or measure infinitely closed to one) only
the latter notion is robust with respect to suppositions.
Only certainties continue to carry measure one in the
presence of any supposition.
A probabilistic account of matter-of-fact
supposition
Our model uses two-place probability functions, some-
times called Popper functions in the literature. These
functions can be characterized as follows:
A space is a couple S = 〈U, F 〉 with U a non-empty
set and F a sigma-field on U. We will focus on the condi-
tional measures obeying (I) for any fixed A, the function
P (X |A) as a function of X is either a (countably addi-
tive) probability measure, or has constant value 1 and
(II) P (B ∩ C|A) = P (B|A)P (C|B ∩ A) for all A,B,C
in F . The unconditional probability of A, pr(A), is
P (A|U).
Axiom II (usually called the Multiplication Axiom)
differs from the usual rule for computing conditional
probabilities by allowing to condition on events of mea-
sure zero. Two-place functions have been indepen-
dently proposed by many authors as the most gen-
eral probabilistic encoding of matter-of-fact supposition
((Joyce 1999) and (van Fraassen 1995) are examples).
In order to determine the qualitative constraints on
belief and conditional belief imposed by this account,
we need to determine which is the body of belief as-
sociated which each two-place measure and how these
bodies of belief change when the measures change.
Paradox-free accounts of the first problem have been
considered by van Fraassen in (van Fraassen 1995) and
then refined, extended and slightly modified in (Arlo´-
Costa 1997) and (Arlo´-Costa & Parikh 1999). The
problem to circumvent here is the so-called lottery para-
dox (Kyburg 1961). This paradox arises when full belief
is identified with measure one. We will follow here the
proposal in (Arlo´-Costa & Parikh 1999). According to
this account probability one is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for full belief.
If P (X |A) is a probability measure as a function of
X , then A is normal and otherwise abnormal. In the
following we shall confine ourselves to the case where
the whole space U is normal and countable. The notion
of normality is closely connected to an epistemic anal-
ysis of the notion of a priori: (A) A is a priori for P iff
P(A | X) = 1 for all X, iff U - A is abnormal for P.
A probability core is a set K which is normal and
satisfies the strong superiority condition (SSC) i.e. if A
is a nonempty subset of K and B is disjoint from K,
then P (B|A ∪B) = 0.
The family of cores induced by a two place probability
function P is nested. That this holds in general has
been shown in (van Fraassen 1995). Moreover it can
also be shown for spaces of arbitrary size that the chain
of belief cores induced by a non-coreless 2-place function
P cannot contain an infinitely descending chain of cores
(the proof is presented in (Arlo´-Costa 1997)).
When the space is countable it can be shown that
there is a smallest as well as a largest core. Moreover,
the smallest core has measure 1. And, more impor-
tantly, this innermost core is constituted by all ‘heavy’
points carrying unconditional positive measure (this is
showed in (Arlo´-Costa & Parikh 1999)).
In (Arlo´-Costa & Parikh 1999) we proposed that the
smallest core be identified with ordinary beliefs (or ex-
pectations) and the largest core with full beliefs, so that
in general full belief (certainties/factual constraints)
will be distinct from probability 1.
Example I: The sample space has a countable set of
atoms, resulting from the following: in independent
trials, a fair coin is flipped until we get a head, and
then the trials stop. The set of possible outcomes is
indexed by the number of tails X = (0, 1, 2, ..., n, ..., ω),
where ω designates never stopping, i.e., flipping
forever and seeing only tails. Evidently pr(X is finite)
= 1 and pr(X = n) =
1
2(n+1), (n = 0, 1, ...), so that
(obviously) pr(X = ω) = 0, and this is the only null
event, apart from the impossible event.
This probability function induces two cores: U and
U − ω. . It seems unreasonable in this case to require
that a rational agent modeled by P ought to fully be-
lieve that X is finite. But one can say that the agent
expects X to be finite.
It is easy to build a two-place function having the
cores depiected in Fig. I and satisfying: (1) the point
(O, not-S) carries measure one (2) the outermost core is
2. Here is a plausible interpretation of this model. First
one can say that the agent in question expects Oswald to
be the sole killer and that, in addition, she fully believes
that somebody killed Kennedy. Her expectations re-
ceive measure one. In this context the proposition that
Oswald did not kill Kennedy contradicts the agent’s ex-
pectations, but it is still compatible with her full beliefs.
According to this view the Warrenite expects that Os-
wald is the sole killer, but he is only certain of the fact
that somebody killed Kennedy. The fact that Oswald
is the sole killer is still open for revision, but the fact
that somebody killed Kenendy is not. The distinction
between expectations and certainties (or factual con-
straints) is usually made in probability theory by using
a different terminology. The needed distinction is be-
tween ‘almost certain’ and certain. Both notions carry
probability one, but only the second is robust with re-
spect to suppositions in the sense that not only its prob-
ability is one but its probability continues to be one in
the presence of any supposition.8
In either case it seems clear that matter-of-fact sup-
position requires the specification of two dimensions of
qualitative attitudes. One encoded by the innermost
core of P, the other by outermost core. We proposed
here to interpret the innermost core in such a way that
all expectations (almost certainties) are entailed by it.
By the same token certainties (full beliefs/factual con-
straints) are understood as what is entailed by the out-
ermost core.9
The system of cores orders the points carrying zero
measure outside the agent’s belief set. One can see the
points inside the core-system (receiving positive rank)
as carrying infinitesimal probability. The cores then
have the function of ordering those infinitesimals. Of
course it could happen that the outermost core coin-
cides with its innermost core. In this case all happens
as if no point receives infinitesimal measure aside the
ones in the lowest rank where all probability mass is
concentrated. This is an extreme situation where ‘al-
most certainty’ and certainty coincide. Limit cases of
this sort require further analysis.
Is it possible to explain the eventual acceptance of
‘If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone else did’ with
respect to a measure whose innermost and outermost
cores are rank 0 in Fig. I? Notice that in this case not
only the agent assigns probability one to (O, not-S),
but he also refuses to assign infinitesimal measure to
any other world. The simple answer in this case is no,
the conditional in question should be rejected. Eventual
acceptance can only be rationalized in terms of a fur-
ther change of the established facts. The probabilistic
model under consideration cannot consider full-belief-
contravening shifts of this sort (the model only covers
expansions of certainties). Models of this type have
been considered in (Levi 1996) (see the section on con-
sensus revision) and to some extent (Stalnaker 1984).10
This essay is only devoted to consider expectation-
based models where expectations and full beliefs are
distinct. As we will see below, even if this distinction is
allowed, a rich model covering sequences of suppositions
departs significantly from AGM.
8van Fraassen characterizes this idea in (van Fraassen
1995) as the probabilistic ‘a priori’.
9According to this view there are full beliefs but not
many of them. In the example historical facts not only carry
probability one (or probability infinitesimally close to one)
but they are also taken as certainties. Other established
facts, like O, still receive maximal measure, but they are
only ‘almost certainties’ and are open to matter-of-fact hy-
pothetical revision.
10See also (van Fraassen 1995) where the innermost core
of a two-place measure is interpreted as encoding the full
beliefs of the agent.
On the dynamics of probabilistic cores
The problem we need to address now is how the system
of cores of a two-place measure changes when the mea-
sure is updated. Probabilistically the problem is how
to revise the two-place probability P with a proposi-
tion A. A natural proposal is the function P(– | – ∩ A),
which we can abbreviate by PA. Sequences of hypothe-
ses are indicated as follows: PA,B..... The following
result shows how the system of cores for PA is related
to the system of cores for P.
Proposition
If SP is the system of cores of P(– | –) and A ∩ U 6=
∅, where U = ∪ SP , then all the elements of: S’= {C
∩ A : C ∈ S and C ∩ A 6= ∅}, are exactly all the
elements of the sub-system of belief cores SP
A
∩ U.
Whenever A fails to overlap the largest core of P,
or when P is abnormal, we set PA to the abnormal P
assigning measure one of every event. In addition, the
innermost core of PA, denoted by I(P), is in this limit
case arbitrarily set to ∅. If F(P) denotes P’s largest core,
we also set F(P) to ∅ by convention. Then the following
properties are satisfied (for non-coreless measures P):
Expansion F(P) ∩ A = F(PA)
Success I(PA) entails A
Preservation If I(P ) ∩ A 6= ∅, then I(P) ∩ A = I(PA)
Restricted Consistency Preservation If I(P) 6= ∅,
and F(P) ∩ A 6= ∅, then I(PA) 6= ∅.
Fixity If P is the abnormal measure, I(PA) = F(PA)
= ∅.
Cumulativity I(PA,B) = I(PA∩B)
These properties are the axioms of a notion of change
called hypothetical revision. The notion has been ax-
iomatized in a more abstract setting (see (Arlo´-Costa
& Thomason 1996) and (Arlo´-Costa 1997)). A cumula-
tive model is a tuple 〈E, U, ∗, ρ, c〉, where U is a universe
of points, E a set of epistemic states, and ρ and c func-
tions mapping epistemic states to propositions in U, in
such a way that, for each E in E, ρ(E) ⊆ c(E). Finally
* is function mapping epistemic states and propositions
to epistemic states. We do not assume that E is closed
under *.
The epistemic states in our probabilistic models are
instantiated as probability functions, the functions ρ
and c as our functions I and F, and * is the analogue of
the [...] operation on probability functions. Then the
property ρ(E) ⊆ c(E) is automatically satisfied. The
rest of the properties of hypothetical revision are also
satisfied via a straightforward translation. For example,
Expansion gets translated into c(E) ∩ A = c(E * A).
[Expansion] c(E) ∩ A = c(E*A)
Explanation: Matter of fact supposition is
characterized by the fact that certainties (full
beliefs/factual constraints) are always preserved.
Suppositions contravening the factual constraints
encoded in c(E) lead to incoherence. Suppositions
compatible with established facts in c(E) go by the
mere expansion of c(E) with the supposed item.
[Success] ρ(E*A) entails A
Explanation: This axiom seems constitutive of any
notion of supposing. To be sure not all forms of belief
change need to be successful. Incoming information
may or may not to be incorporated in the current
view. But supposing A requires to consider a
hypothetical state where A holds for the sake of the
argument.
[Preservation] If ρ(E) ∩ A 6= ∅, then ρ(E) ∩ A =
ρ(E*A)
Explanation: This requirement reflects Ramsey’s ideas
about acceptance of conditionals. When the agent is
open about a hypothetical input the supposition goes
by simple conditioning.
[Restricted Consistency Preservation] If ρ(E) 6= ∅, and
c(E) ∩ A 6= ∅, then ρ(E*A) 6= ∅.
Explanation: Suppositions with items compatible with
the set of factual constraints c(E) lead to coherent
suppositional scenarios.
[Fixity] If ρ(E) = ∅ = c(E), then ρ(E*A) = ∅.
Explanation: Supposition does not have the goal of
restoring consistency to an eventually incoherent view.
The act of supposing with respect to an incoherent
view is vacuous.
[Cumulativity] ρ((E*A)*B) = ρ(E ∗ (A ∩B))
Explanation: This axiom reflects the idea that the
conditions of acceptance of ‘If A, then if B, then C’
are identical with the ones induced by ‘If A and B,
then C’.11
Darwiche and Pearl’s axioms and
Hypothetical Revision
Let a cumulative model be called universal, when for
every epistemic state E, c(E) = U. Let a cumulative
model be called consistent if for each E, ρ(E) is non-
empty. It is easy to see that the following properties
hold in all universal and consistent models.
Success ρ(E ∗A) ⊆ A
11Notice that this idea does not reflect the view that ‘If
A, then if B, then C’ is the deceptive linguistic expression
of ‘If A and B, then C’. This view is compatible with the
popular view among probabilists that there are not iterated
conditionals. The view encode in cumulativity is that there
are bona fide iterated conditionals but that their conditions
of acceptance are regimented in a particualr manner.
Preservation If ρ(E) ∩ A 6= ∅, then ρ(E) ∩ A =
ρ(E*A)
Consistency Preservation ρ(E ∗ A) is consistent if
A is.
Conjunctive Revision If ρ(E∗A)∩B 6= ∅, then ρ(E∗
A) ∩B = ρ(E ∗ (A ∩B))
Conjunctive revision follows from Cumulativity and
Preservation. The previous properties are AGM-like
properties in the iterated setting studied by Darwiche
and Pearl (Darwiche & Pearl 1997). In other words,
the non-iterated properties of universal and consistent
models of hypothetical revision exhibit AGM-like prop-
erties.12. Of course, when universality (or consistency)
is lifted, we have a first discrepancy with the Darwiche-
Pearl axioms, because Consistency Preservation holds
in this case only in its restricted version.
The cumulative models characterize the generalized
Horn patterns of inference of the Rational system of
non-monotonic consequence. This is shown in (Arlo´-
Costa & Parikh 1999). This should perhaps be expected
taking into account the relationships between AGM-like
postulates and rational inference, and the fact that this
notion of inference has no counterpart for consistency
preservation.
The fact that universal and consistent models obey
AGM-like properties, and that cumulative properties
validate well known non-monotonic axioms should not
obscure the point that, when iteration is allowed, hypo-
thetical revision proceeds in a manner clearly at odds
with most methods of belief change studied in the lit-
erature. The central issue is the property of Global
Success, mentioned above. In fact, one of the crucial
features of the probabilistic notion of supposition under
consideration is that when a suppositional constraint is
adopted it is then held fixed during subsequent changes.
Global Success ρ((E ∗A) ∗B) ⊆ A13
Hajek and Harper on probabilistic
supposition
(Hajek & Harper 1996) contains one of the few qualita-
tive set of (non-iterated) axioms for the notion of qual-
itative supposition induced by two-place functions. In
(Arlo´-Costa & Thomason 1996) it is shown that a modi-
fied version of these axioms follow as theorems from our
more general axiomatization:
(E1) ρ(E ∗A) ⊆ A.
12We are adopting here, nevertheless, a Darwiche-Pearl
type of axiomatization, where the central notion is the no-
tion of epistemic state rather than the notion of belief set -
see the discussion in (Darwiche & Pearl 1997)
13 John Collins in (Collins 1990) has argued in favor of
using AGM methods in order to represent matter-of-fact
supposition. Nevertheless, in section 3.8 of (Collins 1990)
Collins restricts the set of permissible entrenchments in or-
der to accommodate Global Success. Although he does not
offer an axiomatization, it seems that the resulting model is
an instance of hypothetical revision.
(E2) If ρ(E) ⊆ A, then ρ(E) = ρ(E ∗A).
(E3) If A ⊆ B and ρ(E ∗B) ∩A 6= ∅, then ρ(E ∗A) =
ρ(E ∗B) ∩A.
(E4 If A ⊆ B and ρ(E ∗B) = ∅, then ρ(E ∗A) = ∅.
Non-Archimedean subjective probability
and two-place probability functions
The following sections will review some of the impor-
tant applications of the account presented above. But
before considering this issue it would be appropriate to
outline the connections between ‘infinitesimal’ probabil-
ity and the type of generalized conditional probability
just considered.
There are two standard manners of representing con-
ditioning with zero measure events. One strategy has
already been reviewed and used to model matter-of-fact
supposition (two-place probability functions). An alter-
native method has gained currency during the last half
of the past century. The gist of this alternative move
is to propose that a proposition can carry infinitesimal
value greater than zero, but smaller than any standard
number. Instead of assigning zero to the proposition
that a randomly chosen point is in the Western hemi-
sphere, we give to it an infinitesimal value. So, if we
assign an infinitesimal value i to the point being in the
Southern part of the Western hemisphere and 2i to the
proposition that it is in the Western hemisphere; the
proposition that it is in the Southern part of the West-
ern hemisphere, conditional on its being in the Western
hemisphere, is defined and carries infinitesimal value
i/2i. Of course, in order to have a workable proposal,
a calculus of infinitesimal magnitudes has to be devel-
oped.
Several well know properties of ordered algebraic
fields are violated. The so-called Archimedean axiom
is violated. If we focus on the real field, the axiom es-
tablishes that, for any positive number r, no matter how
small, there is an integer n such that nr > 1. A non-
Archimedean field will contain at least an ‘infinitesimal’
element ε with the property that nε < 1, for every pos-
itive integer n, even though ε is itself positive. Such a
number should be smaller than any real and it cannot be
a real itself. Abraham Robinson’s pioneer work in this
area made possible the articulation of a mathematically
workable theory of non-Archimedean real fields. Since
then the theory has been variously applied in the the-
ory of games and decisions. Non-Archimedean expected
utility and subjective probability have been studied and
variously applied. More recently this account has been
considered in KR applications (Lehmann 1998).
The two approaches just considered (infinitesimal
probability and two-place functions) have grown inde-
pendently and their foundational problems have differ-
ent roots. Perhaps non-standard probability is a more
adequate (or ‘intuitive’) representational tool, but two-
place functions have the additional advantage of a sim-
ple axiomatization - at last this is so for most applica-
tions where the domain of the underlying sigma field is
at most countable. In addition, as we showed above,
bridges between qualitative and quantitative change
can be established for two-place functions.
In spite of the aforementioned differences Van McGee
has recently offered an interesting result showing that it
is possible to map statements about non-standard prob-
abilities into corresponding facts about ordinary valued
two-place probability functions (McGee 1994). The gist
of the result is a back and forth proof showing that the
standard values of infinitesimal probability functions
are representable as two-place functions, and that every
two-place function is representable in terms of the stan-
dard real values of some infinitesimal measure. When
this theorem is complemented by the connection be-
tween qualitative belief change and (two-place) proba-
bility kinematics presented above it gives an interesting
insight about the qualitative commitments of models of
supposition in terms of infinitesimal probability.
Applications: non-monotonic reasoning
Judea Pearl and Lehmann-Magidor provided the first
probabilistic models of non-monotonic reasoning in
terms of infinitesimal probability. Pearl also offered the
first accounts of several ‘qualitative’ methods of belief
revision (like Spohn’s ordinal conditional funcitons) as
offering an infinitesimal analysis of conditional proba-
bilities (Pearl 1994). Taking into account McGee’s re-
sult, the analysis presented in this paper should prompt
the conjecture that some of the standard systems of
non-monotonic logic should admit models in terms of
matter-of-fact supposing (via two-place functions). The
conjecture has been studied and confirmed in (Arlo´-
Costa & Parikh 1999). Unlike previous models this
work produces an analysis of non-monotonic conse-
quence in terms of probabilistic expectations - unify-
ing existing probabilistic models with purely qualitative
models in terms of expectations (Gardenfors & Makin-
son 1989). The system of rational logic of Lehmann-
Magidor is characterized in terms of the universal and
consistent probabilistic models introduced above.
The gist of the analysis is as follows. B follows non-
monotonically from A with respect to the two-place
measure P(X | Y) whenever P(B | A) = 1. More-
over P(B | A) = 1 if and only of the smallest core
of P(X | Y ∩ A) entails B. In other words, B follows
non-monotonically from A with respect to the two-place
measure P(X | Y) if and only if the expectations asso-
ciated with P(X | Y ∩ A) entail B.
Applications:Iterated probabilistic
conditionals
McGee’s result is presented only for non-iterated prob-
ability change. In (Arlo´-Costa & Thomason 1996) it is
shown that (1) McGee’s canonical proof cannot be ex-
tended in order to study sequences of changes, (2) that
there is nevertheless a manner of extending the proof,
and (3) that this extension requires the assumption of
Cumulativity.
This result is suggestive. It shows that Cumulativ-
ity is a qualitative property deeply rooted in the two
types of non-standard conditional probability consid-
ered above, and that it is needed in order to guarantee
their coincidence in the iterated case. This is so quite
independently of the reasons pro and con one might
adduce in order to use it in models of supposition.
Since Cumulativity has been rejected in most of the
contemporary models of inquiry (AGM and UPDATE
are examples) the former results suggests that a uni-
fied picture of infinitesimal and two-place probability
might be only compatible with certain interpretations
of those extensions of conditional probability. Matter-
of-fact supposition is, of course, one of the possible in-
tended interpretations.
More applications: Decision Theory
The distinction between matter-of-fact supposition and
subjunctive supposition is crucial to understand the
current debate about the foundations of decision the-
ory. Most of the so-called causal decision theorists de-
fend the idea that the notion of conditional probability
used in the calculation of expected utility goes by imag-
ing (or UPDATE). In other words they argue that deci-
sion makers considering hypothetical situations engage
in an exercise of subjunctive, rather than matter-of-fact
supposition ((Joyce 1999) offers an up to date overview
of work in this field together with novel results). Judea
Pearl is the most prominent KR researcher working in
this field. He has recently written a book-length argu-
ment in defense of the causal theory (Pearl 2000). He
has also produced arguments suggesting that subjunc-
tive supposition can be understood in terms of matter-
of-fact supposing in the context of a richer theory where
causal influence is encoded via graphs (Goldszmidt &
Pearl 1992). Meek and Glymour have offered a slightly
different reduction. The basic idea is that supposing
subjunctively that A is tantamount to suppose matter-
of-factly that an action has been performed in order to
bring A about (Meek & Glymour 1994). Finally Levi
considered a reduction of different sort in (Levi 1996).
The second application in this field is related to mod-
els of non-Archimedean subjective probability, particu-
larly conditional non-Archimedean probability. The re-
sults presented above suggest that this notion can be
understood in terms of matter-of-fact supposition.
More applications: Game Theory
The probabilistic encoding of the notion of matter-of-
fact supposition plays a central role in recent extensions
of Harsanyi’s theory of types in game theory. For exam-
ple, Battigalli and Sinischalchi proposed in (Battigalli
& Siniscalchi 1999) to use two-place functions in order
to define hierarchies of conditional types in multistage
games. Dov Samet has simultaneously studied qualita-
tive notions of hypothetical knowledge in games. These
applications require the use of iteration. Nevertheless
it is often not sufficiently appreciated that in these set-
tings the qualitative properties of probabilistic models
in terms of two-place functions are at odds with most of
the standard models of belief change. In this essay we
offered an exact modeling of those qualitative proper-
ties, some intuitive support for them and a comparison
with other well-known methods.
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